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Peer Dialogue: The How and What of
"Appropriate Validation" Under Daubert:
Reconsidering the Treatment of Einstein and
Freud
Edward J. Imwinkelried"
"[I]n practice, a gatekeeping role for the judge, no matter how flexible,
inevitably on occasion will prevent the jury from learning of authentic
insights and innovations. That, nevertheless, is the balance that is struck by
the Rules of Evidence designed not for the exhaustive search for cosmic
understanding but for the particularized resolution of legal disputes."
Justice Blackmun, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S.
579, 597 (1993)
In its landmark decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
the Supreme Court announced that the trial judge must play a gatekeeping' or
screening' role in deciding whether proffered expert testimony constitutes
sufficiently reliable "scientific ... knowledge"3 to qualify for admission under
Federal Rule of Evidence 702. The Court declared that the proponent of the
testimony must lay a foundation establishing "appropriate validation"4 for the
expert's underlying theory or technique.
In order to intelligently assess the adequacy of a validation foundation, the
trial judge must address two questions: what must be validated, and how should
it be validated?' In his article, Professor Crump touches on both questions.
Having read his article several times, I come away convinced that although
Professor Crump's analysis of the second question is largely right, there is a
serious problem with his analysis of the first question. On the one hand,
Professor Crump is correct in arguing that the courts should not limit
"appropriate validation" to controlled scientific experimentation and induction.
On the other hand, his assertions about the judicial treatment of Einstein's and
Freud's theories reflect an epistemological misconception-a misunderstanding
* Visiting Professor of Law, University College Dublin; Professor of Law,
University of California at Davis; B.A. 1967, J.D. 1969, University of San Francisco.
1. 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
2. Id. at 589.
3. Id. at 589-90.
4. Id. at 590.
5. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Meaning of "Appropriate Validation "in Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Interpreted in Light of the Broader Rationalist
Tradition, Not the Narrow Scientific Tradition, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. _ (forthcoming
April 2003).
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relating to the state of knowledge in any given scientific discipline at a particular
time.
I. How SHOULD THE EXPERT'S THEORY OR TECHNIQUE BE
VALIDATED?
As Professor Crump observes, unfortunately Justice Blackmun's opinion
in Daubert is susceptible to the interpretation that to validate purportedly
scientific testimony, the proponent must demonstrate that the underlying theory
or technique has been validated by controlled scientific experimentation. The
Justice's citations to Hempel' and Popper7 lend themselves to that interpretation.
Further, at the very beginning of the list of the factors the Justice suggested trial
judges consider in evaluating the reliability of the proffered testimony, the
Justice mentioned the "key question.., of... whether [the theory] can be (and
has been) tested."8  These passages suggest that a showing of such
experimentation is a "canonical"9 or invariable requirement for validating a
proffer of scientific evidence.
However, Professor Crump is right when he contends that Daubert need not
and, more importantly, should not be read in that narrow manner. Justice
Blackmun wrote that "[t]he inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is, we emphasize, a
flexible one."'" More fundamentally, rather than naively lauding the scientific
technique of controlled experimentation, in Daubert Justice Blackmun frankly
acknowledged the limits of the scientific enterprise." The experimental process
is essentially inductive; and the process cannot yield certainty because there are
always further experimentg that could be conducted-and, thus, the unavoidable
possibility of subsequent falsification of the theory.' 2 The Justice's appreciation
6. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Sheila Jasanoff, Judging Science: Issues, Assumptions, Models, in ROSCOE
POUND FOUNDATION, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN THE COURTS: CONCEPTS AND
CONTROVERSIES (Report of the 1997 Forum for State Court Judges) 9, 11-12 (1997). See
generally Adina Schwartz, A "Dogma of Empiricism" Revisited. Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and the Need to Resurrect the Philosophical Insight of Frye
v. United States, 10 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 149 (1997).
10. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
1I. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Evidence Law Visits Jurassic Park: The Far-
Reaching Implications of the Daubert Court's Recognition of the Uncertainty of the
Scientific Enterprise, 81 IOWA L. REV. 55, 59-65 (1995).
12. See generally Margaret G. Farrell, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.: Epistemology and Legal Process, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2183 (1994); Bert Black,
The Supreme Court's View of Science: Has Daubert Exorcised the Certainty Demon?,
15 CARDOzO L. REV. 2129 (1994).
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of those limits prompted him to remark that "arguably, there are no certainties
in science."' 3 Daubert repudiates the simplistic, popular notion that science
yields certainty.' 4 It consequently would be ironic to treat the opinion as
mandating that the proponent of expert testimony rely exclusively on controlled
experimentation and induction.
In that respect, Professor Crump's criticism of an illiberal reading of
Daubert hits the mark. Rather than interpreting "appropriate validation" in light
of the narrow scientific tradition, the expression should be read in light of the
broader rationalist tradition in Anglo-American evidence law.' 5 To begin with,
controlled scientific experimentation is not the only basis for empirical induction.
In some disciplines such as geology, scientists must rely on controlled
observation rather than experimentation:
There is very little we can do in the way of laboratory experiments that
can answer questions about what has been happening on the earth over
millions of years. We cannot control at will the enormous forces that
shape the earth's surface-the glaciers, the volcanoes, the drift of the
continents-nor can we wait millions of years for the outcome of such
an experiment.'6
Nor does induction exhaust the possibilities of validation. Professor Crump
notes that Newton "deduced" many of his propositions about the behavior of
phenomena in the corporeal world. A contemporary rationalist would certainly
accept deduction as appropriate validation. 7 Like Baconian induction, deductive
reasoning is a recognized branch of logic.' 8 A proposition deduced by strict
mathematic logic may be regarded as demonstrated or proven.19
Professor Crump is a bit unclear as to whether he would regard theorizing
falling short of deduction as adequate validation. If he believes that there is
adequate validation when an expert describes a theory that is (1) not logically
self-contradictory and (2) consistent with an empirically validated theory, we part
13. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.
14. Imwinkelried, supra note 11, at 59-65.
15. WILLIAM TWINING, RETHINKING EVIDENCE: EXPLORATORY ESSAYS 35,40,47-
48, 74, 83 (1990); see also Imwinkelried, supra note 5, at _.
16. MARTIN GOLDSTEIN & INGE F. GOLDSTEIN, How WE KNOW: AN EXPLORATION
OF THE SCIENTIFIC PROCESS 171 (1978).
17. JOHN ZIMAN, RELIABLE KNOWLEDGE: AN EXPLORATION OF THE GROUNDS FOR
BELIEF IN SCIENCE 150, 163-64 (1978).
18. DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., SCIENCE IN THE LAW: STANDARDS, STATISTICS, AND
RESEARCH ISSUES § 4-1.0 (2002) (discussing the method of drawing inferences from
empirical evidence).
19. ALBUREY CASTELL, AN INTRODUCTION TO MODERN PHILOSOPHY 176 (2d ed.
1963); ZIMAN, supra note 17, at 150, 163.
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company. I favor a more rigorous standard. However, I endorse Professor
Crump's essential point that purportedly scientific testimony need not be
validated by controlled scientific experimentation.
II. WHA TMUST BE VALIDATED?
In order to expose the supposed weaknesses of a rigorous validation
standard, Professor Crump poses a number of hypotheticals, notably ones
involving two celebrated modem scientists, Albert Einstein and Sigmund Freud.
One is a giant of the paradigmatic hard science of physics while the other was
a pioneer in the soft science of psychiatry. Professor Crump asserts that the
application of a rigorous admissibility standard would bar testimony by these
scientific giants. In the course of his analysis of the Einstein hypothetical,
Professor Crump states that a demanding validation standard would arguably
"force [the trial judge] to exclude [Einstein] from the c6urtroom."2 ° It is
submitted that the analysis of these hypotheticals is flawed because it suffers
from a misconception as to what must be validated.
In my comments on an earlier version of Professor Crump's article, I
pointed him to a wonderful article by Professor Risinger.2" In that article,
Professor Risinger argues that Daubert should not be interpreted as requiring the
judge to pass on the "global" reliability of the expert's discipline;22 rather, the
opinion ought to be read as mandating the judge to focus more narrowly on the
reliability of the specific theory or technique the expert proposes relying on.
That reading of Daubert and its progeny is sound. Near the end of his
opinion in Daubert, Justice Blackmun stated that the proponent's foundation
must convince the trial judge that the theory or technique is sufficiently reliable
to perform "the task at hand."2  Earlier in the opinion, in the process of
explaining the necessity that the theory or technique "fit" the case, the Justice
elaborated that the theory or technique must have "a valid scientific connection
to the pertinent inquiry."24 The Court's 1997 decision in General Electric Co.
v. Joiner5 fits the same pattern. There, Chief Justice Rehnquist analyzed the
question of whether the animal studies cited by the plaintiff were an adequate
basis for the expert's opinion as to the cause of Joiner's small-cell lung cancer.
20. David Crump, The Trouble with Daubert-Kumho: Reconsidering the Supreme
Court's Philosophy of Science, 68 Mo. L. REv. 1, 22 (2003).
21. Michael D. Risinger, Defining the "Task at Hand": Non-Science Forensic
Science After Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767 (2000).
22. Id. at 773.
23. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
24. Id. at 591-92.
25. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
[Vol. 68
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The Chief Justice initially listed the defense criticisms of the animal studies. 6
The Chief Justice then wrote:
Respondent [plaintiff] failed to reply to this criticism. Rather than
explaining how and why the experts could have extrapolated their
opinions from these seemingly far-removed animal studies, respondent
chose "to proceed as if the only issue [was] whether animal studies
could ever be a proper foundation for an expert's opinion." 864 F.
Supp., at 1324. Of course, whether animal studies can ever be a
proper foundation for an expert's opinion was not the issue. The issue
was whether these experts' opinions were sufficiently supported by the
[particular] animal studies on which they purported to rely.27
I was pleased to see that in the final version of his article, Professor Crump
mentioned Professor Risinger's analytic approach. However, Professor Crump
either rejects that approach or does not fully appreciate its significance. If that
approach were applied to Professor Crump's Einstein and Freud hypotheticals,
we could avoid the absurd consequence of barring these scientific giants from
the courtroom.
At the macro level of a broad field of science, at any given time the
discourse in the field will include a spectrum or mix of types of propositions. In
some cases, the propositions circulating in the field will have such substantial
supporting data that we can be relatively confident that we "know" the
proposition to be true, at least as a working assumption. However, the discourse
is also likely to include unsubstantiated conjectures and speculations that will
later be exposed as invalid.2" It would be premature to permit testimony about
any theory circulating in the field simply because many, if not most, of the
propositions current in the field's discourse have passed the muster of empirical
validation. Inferring the truth of one proposition in the field from the truth of
another proposition in the same field can be a classic non sequitur. Consider, for
example, the discipline of forensic pathology. It is true that the courts routinely
26. Id. at 144.
27. Id.; see also Bourne ex rel. Bourne v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours, 189 F. Supp.
2d 482, 496-97 (S.D. W. Va. 2002). The narrow focus is even clearer in the Court's
1999 decision involving non-scientific expert testimony, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,
526 U.S. 137 (1999). The Court emphasized that the expert Carlson had developed a
"particular" method for determining whether a tire blowout was caused by a
manufacturing defect. Id. at 154. Rather than relying on "the general theory that, in the
absence of evidence of abuse, a defect will normally have caused a separation," Carlson
"employed a more specific theory." Id. In Justice Breyer's words, "the question before
the trial court was specific, not general." Id. at 156.
28. ZIMAN, supra note 17, at 130-33.
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accept pathologists' testimony on a wide range of subjects.29 Judicial receptivity
to pathologists' opinions on many subjects, such as the estimation of stature from
skeletal remains, is justifiable, because there is a substantial body of research
investigating the accuracy of such estimations.3" However, the literature in the
pathology field also includes discussions of many novel conjectures, especially
with respect to the determination of time of death.3 Despite the respected status
of the field of forensic pathology, it would be fallacious to leap to the conclusion
that pathologists should be allowed to testify about any theory that has garnered
a measure of attention in their field. Or, as Professor Risinger has argued, even
if one posits the general reliability of the discipline of questioned document
examination, that assumption does not dictate the admissibility of testimony
identifying the individual author of handprinting by a native Japanese writer
trained to eschew individuality and strictly follow a prescribed printing style.32
The same holds true at the micro level of the theorizing of an individual
scientist. Although some of the expert's theories and techniques may warrant
judicial acceptance, other conjectures by the scientist may not be ready for
courtroom use. Consider Professor Crump's hypotheticals involving Einstein
and Freud.
A. Einstein
As Professor Crump twice notes in his analysis of this hypothetical, a good
deal of Einstein's theorizing about relativity has been empirically validated.33
Astronomers' observations give us good, solid reason to believe in the
gravitational impact of black holes. However, should we therefore conclude that
Einstein would be entitled to testify about tachyons? Is it enough that the
supposition of the existence of tachyons is consistent with other features of
relativity theory?
That question should be answered in the negative. Induction lends little
support to the supposition. Although there are data seemingly validating other
aspects of relativity, there are apparently little or no data specifically pointing to
the existence of tachyons. Moreover, the existence of tachyons cannot be
"deduced" by strict logic. As a matter of logic, the tachyon supposition is
29. 2 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 19-
10(B) (3d ed. 1999).
30. Id. § 19-4(B).
31. Id. § 19-8(A).
32. Risinger, supra note 21, at 798-800 (citing United States v. Fujii, 152 F. Supp.
2d 939 (N.D. Ill. 2000)).
33. At one point, he states that "[m]any of the predictions of relativity theory have
been verified by observation." Later, he refers to "relativity theory, much of which has
been empirically verified." Crump, supra note 20, at 22.
[Vol. 68
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consistent with other, validated features of relativity theory; but their validation
does not dictate the truth of the supposition in the same manner in which Newton
deduced physical laws. A scientist would find it relevant that the supposition is
not self-contradictory and, better still, consistent with other, proven facets of
relativity theory. However, without more, the appropriate scientific response is
not to embrace the supposition but, rather, to characterize the supposition as a
plausible theory worthy of serious investigation. In science, it is a grave mistake
to equate the plausible and the proven. The scientist's basic mindset is
skepticism.34
Professor Crump's analysis of the Freud hypothetical demonstrates the
danger of accepting a theory simply because of its consistency with other,
validated theories:
[S]ome of Freud's... hypotheses have been rejected by [subsequent]
observation. His idea that personality development was concentrated
in childhood stages... is contradicted by research indicating, instead,
that development is lifelong, and his assertion that gender identity
emerges from an "Oedipal complex".., is contradicted by evidence
that gender identity emerges much earlier, and emerges in households
without opposite-gendered parents.3"
Does this mean, as Professor Crump fears, that a rigorous admissibility
standard will force the courts to "exclude [Einstein] from the courtroom"? Of
course not. What it means is that the attorney who calls Einstein to the stand
would have to confine Einstein's testimony to the other physics theories that are
supported by adequate validation-deduction or induction demonstrating that
those theories are more than plausible speculations consistent with proven
theories. Einstein would unquestionably be permitted to testify to those theories.
For that matter, if on direct examination Einstein omitted any mention of
tachyons, at least in the jury's presence, it is doubtful that the opposing attorney
would even be allowed to question Einstein about his advocacy of a tachyon
theory that lacked substantiation. An expert's advocacy of an unsubstantiated
theory is certainly not recognized as a permissible method of impeachment in
Article VII of the Federal Rules. If, albeit unsubstantiated, the theory is not self-
contradictory and is consistent with other, validated theories, the tachyon theory
is not outlandish. Hence, the expert's support for the theory has little probative
value for the purpose of calling into question either the witness's mental
competency or the witness's expertise. A judge with any degree of
sophistication should realize that any scientist is likely to favor some theories
that have not as yet been validated. Given that realization, many judges would
34. ZIMAN, supra note 17, at 72, 109, 127.
35. Crump, supra note 20, at 25.
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likely rule that under Federal Rule of Evidence 403,36 the evidence has such
minimal probative value that cross-examination about the tachyon theory should
be precluded.
B. Freud
Professor Crump fears that under a rigorous admissibility standard, Freud
would suffer the same fate that he hypothesized for Einstein, namely, banishment
from the witness stand. However, as in the case of Einstein, that fear is
exaggerated.
Suppose that in a psychiatric malpractice case, the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant psychiatrist was negligent in using psychoanalytic techniques to
diagnose and treat the plaintiff. The defense calls Freud as a witness. Freud
proposes testifying that his theories can be used effectively in treating disordered
patients. Would that testimony necessarily lack "appropriate validation"? Here
Freud would not be using his theories for predictive37 purposes and attempting
to testify that the patient's disorder was probably caused by a disturbing
childhood sexual encounter. Rather, Freud would simply be testifying that
whatever the cause of the disorder, such disorders can sometimes be effectively
treated by psychoanalytic techniques. Professor Crump states that Freud
developed his dream process theory after "repeated empirical observations."38
We now have the benefit of the extensive, collective experience of many
therapists who have relied on psychoanalytic techniques and witnessed an
improvement in the mental health of numerous patients. That experience should
be adequate validation in the malpractice case.39
Suppose, though, that in a rape prosecution, a psychiatrist was prepared to
testify that the content of the alleged victim's dreams is evidence that she was
subjected to the rape alleged in the indictment. Professor Crump points out that
in his work, Freud "did not pretend to be predictive."4 However, other mental
health professionals have ventured into the predictive thicket and proposed
36. "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EvID. 403.
37. Some have suggested that in this context, it would be preferable to use the
expression "postdict," rather than "predict." See Deborah Davis & William C. Follette,
Rethinking Probative Value of Evidence: Base Rates, Intuitive Profiling, and the
"Postdiction" of Behavior, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 133 (2002). The inference is
retrospective, inferring an earlier causal event from a currently existing condition or fact.
38. Crump, supra note 20, at 24.
39. EdwardJ. Imwinkelried, Expert Witness: Beyond"One Size,"NAT'L., Aug. 28,
2000, at A 18.
40. Crump, supra note 20, at 24.
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testifying that a patient's subsequent conduct and mental state evidenced an
earlier, causal event such as a rape." Now the "task at hand" differs. In this
variation of the hypothetical, our Freud is being invited to draw a different
inference. The witness's theory is being pressed into service as a fact-finding
tool.4" Even if the witness's other theories have been verified and other
applications of dream theory have been validated, the judge would be entitled to
bar this testimony absent a stronger foundation.43
In short, Professor Crump is correct in thinking that Einstein and Freud
would suffer the same fate. However, it is not the fate Professor Crump fears.
They would not be altogether barred from the courtroom simply because some
of their theories did not satisfy a rigorous admissibility test for scientific
testimony. Rather, the judge would focus on the "task at hand," the evaluation
of the specific theory or technique that the expert contemplated relying on to
make the determination to which the expert was called to testify. If the
foundation for that theory or technique comported with a broad rationalist
understanding of "validation," the testimony should be ruled admissible.
However, the admissibility of that testimony would not mandate or justify
Einstein's or Freud's testimony about unsubstantiated theories that are nothing
more than plausible hypotheses worthy of systematic scientific investigation.
II. CONCLUSION
Professor Crump has done us an important service by demonstrating the
danger of equating "appropriate validation" with controlled scientific
experimentation and induction. Daubert does not demand that equation. The
analysis of the reliability of proffered scientific testimony ought to be informed
by the broader rationalist tradition in Anglo-American evidence law. Controlled
experimentation, controlled observation, and deduction all would be satisfactory
to a skeptical rationalist.
However, Professor Risinger has done us an equally important service by
demonstrating the wisdom of focusing on the specific "task at hand" in
evaluating the reliability of scientific testimony. Professor Crump loses sight
41. 1 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 29, § 9-4 (a discussion of rape
trauma syndrome).
42. See State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 230 (Minn. 1982).
43. Imwinkelried, supra note 39, at A18. In Daubert, Justice Blackmun
commented:
The study of the phases of the moon . . . may provide valid scientific
"knowledge" about whether a certain night was dark .... However, ...
evidence that the moon was full on a certain night will not assist the trier of
fact in determining whether an individual was unusually likely to have
behaved irrationally on that night.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993).
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of that focus in his analysis of the Einstein and Freud hypotheticals. Without a
better foundation, as a trial judge I would bar even an Einstein from testifying
about the existence of tachyons. However, I would still permit him to testify
about other, substantiated facets of relativity theory. His support for the tachyon
supposition would not preclude his testimony about those other facets, and under
Rule 403 1 would be strongly inclined to prevent the cross-examiner from even
questioning Einstein about his tachyon theory.
By the same token, as a trial judge I would prevent even a Freud from
giving predictive testimony, based on a psychiatric theory which is merely
plausible. The theory might relate to an important enough question to warrant
the time and expenditure of subsequent scientific study, but again, without more
the trial judge should not allow the expert to draw a predictive inference based
on the theory. Yet, as the psychiatric malpractice example illustrates, if the "task
at hand" changes, the same expert ought to be permitted to testify about other
theories which are supported by adequate validation; and sometimes collective,
successful clinical experience will constitute adequate foundation. The theories
of neither a discipline nor even an individual expert within the discipline should
be assessed "globally." The most sensible approach is to demand validation for
the specific theory or technique the expert invokes. That approach is consistent
with the scientific tradition. Even when a theory is plausible, a scientist should
regard it with skepticism" rather than accepting the theory at face value. After
announcing the relativity theory, Einstein himself wondered out loud whether the
theory would later be "proven correct. '4 In Einstein's words, "[the important
thing is not to stop questioning. 4"
44. ZIMAN, supra note 17, at 72, 109, 127.
45. Address at the Sorbonne, Paris, December 1929, quoted in THE OXFORD
DICTIONARY OF MODERN QUOTATIONS 73 (T. Augarde ed., 1991).
46. Personal memoir of William Miller, Editor, LIFE (May 2, 1955), quoted in THE
GREAT QUOTATIONS 225 (G. Seldes ed., 1993).
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